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DOWN WITH F®RESEEABILITY !
®F THIN SKULLS AIN RESCUERS
ALLEN M. LINDEN*
Toronto
Introduction
We have made a mistake. We have let ourselves be seduced by
the influential advocates of the foreseeability doctrine. We could
not help ourselves . They informed us that, in order to be con-
sistent and logical, foresight had to limit liability for negligence
as well as create it.' They asserted that the foresight doctrine was
a "comparatively simple rule"' which permitted an "empirical de-
termination" of the scope of liability.' They assured us that the
principle was a just and fair one.' It is not hard to understand why,
after many years of resistance, these blandishments finally proved
too much for us and we succumbed . In 1961 the Privy Council
in the case of'the Wagon Mound (No. I) 5 trumpeted the triumph
of "simplicity, logic and justice"' throughout the Commonwealth.
Viscount Simonds, rejecting the authority of Polemis,' declared that
*Allen M. Linden, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto, Ontario.
1 Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts (1939), 52 Iiarv.
L. Rev. 372, 48 Yale L.J . 390, 39 Col. L. Rev. 20 .' Goodhart, The Imaginary Necktie and The Rule in Re Polemis (1952),
68 L.Q . Rev. 514, at p. 533.
'Williams, The Risk Principle (1961), 77 L.Q. Rev. 179, at p. 90 .
4 Seavey, op . cit., footnote 1.
$ Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Marts Dock & Engineering Co.,
'[1961] A.C . 388 . See .Fleming, The Passing of Polemis (1961), 39 Can.
Bar Rev. 489; J. C. Smith, Requiem for Polemis (1965), 2 U.B.C. L. Rev.
159.
6 Fleming, op . cit ., ibid., at p. 422.
'In re an Arbitration between Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co . Ltd.,
[19211 3 K.B . 568.
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"it is the foresight of the reasonable man which alone can de-
termine responsibility"!
After eight years, however, it has become apparent that the
proponents of the foresight principle were false prophets. Con-
fusion, illogic and injustice still reign. According to Wagon Mound
(No. 1) the defendant would not be held liable for consequences
that he could not reasonably foresee . It did not take the House
of Lords very long to dilute this principle by holding in Hughes
v. Lord Advocates that it is necessary only to foresee the general
type of accident that transpires and not the precise way in which
it occurs . Needless to say, this distinction has spawned some re-
markable decisions . For example, in Stewart v. West African
Terminals," having one's fingers crushed by a cable in a pulley
has been held to be the same type of accident as tripping over
the cable or straining oneself lifting it out of the way. On the
other hand, in Doughty V . Turner Manufacturing" being burned
by hot cyanide as a result of a chemical change that caused an
eruption was held not to have been the same type of accident
as being splashed by it . Moreover, Wagon Mound (No. 1) was
held not to affect the thin-skull rule that holds a defendant liable
for all the physical injuries suffered by his victim, whether fore-
seeable or not." Finally, in Wagon Mound (No. 2) 13 it was held
that where the actual damage was not reasonably foreseeable, the
defendant will still be held if there is a "possibility" of that damage
(at least where the activity is devoid of social utility) . There have
also been some recent Canadian decisions which indicate that the
foresight doctrine may generate confusion, inconsistency and in-
justice."
It could not have been otherwise for there are no easy answers
to the excruciatingly complex matter of placing limits on the ex-
tent of liability . The Polemis rule which limited liability to the
direct consequences of the negligent act, proved unsatisfactory.
To be sure, some expressed their "faith in the capacity of our
8 Supra, footnote 5, at p . 424 .
e [1963] A.C . 837, 1 All E.R. 705 .
1 ° [196412 Lloyd's Rep . 371 .
11 [19641 1 Q.B. 518.
12 See infra, I, for a complete discussion of this.
23 Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. The Miller Steamship Co., [1967]
1 A.C . 617, [1966] 2 All E.R. 709 . For a full discussion of this case see
J. C. Smith, The Limits of Tort Liability in Canada : Remoteness, Fore-
seeability and Proximate Cause, in Linden, ed ., Studies in Canadian Tort
Law (1968), p . 98 .
14 Jones v . Wabigwan, [1968] 2 O.R . 837 ; Ostrowski v . Lotto (1968),
2 D.L.R . (3d) 440 .
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judges to answer these questions"" and others praised Polemis
for its flexibility and its "appeal to common sense" which "allows
scope for the intuitive judgment"." For, after all, it was contended
"the correct solution to a remoteness problem is felt rather than
deduced from formulated principles"." Moreover, "it would not
occur to the ordinary man to question the justice" of the rule that
"the defendant must take the plaintiff and the consequences as
he finds them"." But the directness formula led to a "long period
of baffling and sterile discourse amidst a labyrinth of pseudo-
logical and metaphysical controversy" ." The pages of the law re-
ports were filled with impressive discourse about chains, links,
gears, nets, immediate causes, precipitating causes, conditions,
causa causans and causa sine qua non. It all sounded very scienti-
fic but it gave us no clue about the real reasons why the court was
deciding the case as it did. Polemis did not deserve to survive
and was rightly jettisoned in the Wagon Mound (No. I) .
Earlier, the courts had flirted for a time with another concept
to the effect that once a dependant was found to be negligent,
liability would be imposed for all of the consequences of his act,
whether or not they were foreseeable or direct." In some ways, this
was an attractive doctrine that might well have won the day, but
it was attacked from every quarter. Professor Fleming contended
that it was "unthinkable to accept liability for all the consequences
in its quite literal sense" ." Dr . Goodhart described it as a "startling
doctrine"" that leads to absurd results unless "all the consequences
are limited in some way"." Before very long, this theory of un-
limited liability was also abandoned.
It seems, therefore, that liability for negligent conduct must
be limited in some way. Polemis has failed. Wagon Mound (No.
I) has failed . Other attempts have failed" And all future attempts
will fail as long as we persist in our quest for one magic formula
to solve all the varied problems raised by the proximate cause
is Lord Wright, Re Folemis (1953), 14 Mod. L . Rev . 393, at p . 405 .is Payne, Foresight and Remoteness of Damage in Negligence (1962),
25 Mod. L . Rev. 1, at p. 9.17 Ibid., at p . 22 . 11 Ibid., at p . 11 .
19 Fleming, op. cit., footnote 5, at p. 491 .
"Smith v. L. & S. Imo . Ry . (1871), L.R . 6 C.P . 14.
81 Fleming, op. . cit., footnote - 5, at p. 491 .
22 Goodhart, Liability and Compensation (1960), 76 L.Q . Rev . 567,
at p . 572 .
11 Ibid., at p . 580 . Contra : McLaughlin, Proximate Cause (1925), 39
Harv . L. Rev. 149, at p . 164 .
24 For a list of different approaches to this problem see Prosser, -Hand-
book of the Law of Torts (3rd ed ., 1964), p. 282 et seq.
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question . To achieve more satisfactory results, we must abandon
our search for simplistic, pre-packaged solutions. We must instead
define the problems of proximate cause or remoteness with more
precision and devise an approach that will demand a frank con-
sideration of all the relevant factors involved in each type of case .
True, there is room for some discretion, for some feeling and
even for some intuition here, but this should be harnessed in a
rational way. The most important thing is not to forget what we
are trying to accomplish with the foresight doctrine. It is being
used (as we have used the concept of "proximateness", remoteness,
directness and others) to limit the extent of damages for which an
admittedly negligent defendant is to be held accountable." The
question to be answered is this : is it fair to hold the defendant
responsible for the consequences about which the plaintiff is com-
plaining?
It may be that the thin-skull cases should be treated differently
than the mental suffering or economic loss cases . It may be that
the rescue cases should not be handled in the same way as cases
of other intervening forces . It may be that certain ulterior con-
sequences should render the defendant liable while others should
not. One word formula should not be expected to resolve satis-
factorily all of these different types of problems . What is needed
is a detailed analysis of the judicial treatment of each type of
problem to determine the policy choices it presents, and the real
reasons for the decisions. It is a laborious process, but it must be
done . In this article, I shall examine the cases concerning the
"thin skull" and the rescuer problem to discover what the courts
are doing and why they are doing it . It will become apparent that
the foresight doctrine alone is not enough . It is because of this
that I say dawn with foreseeability!
I. The Thin-skull Problem.
Since the turn of the century, it has been accepted that a negligent
defendant must take his victim as he finds him. The thin-skull rule
was first enunciated by Lord Justice Kennedy in Dulieu v. White,
even before Polemis was decided, in these words: "If a man is
negligently run over or otherwise negligently injured in his body,
it is no answer to the sufferer's claim for damage that he would
"See Fleming, The Law of Torts (3rd ed., 1965), p. 185 ; Green,
Rationale of Proximate Cause (1927) ; Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, in Selec-
ted Topics on the Law of Torts (1953) .
26 [1901] 2 K.B . 669, at p. 679 (Plaintiff pregnant and driver "did not
anticipate" that she was in this condition) .
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have suffered less injury, or no injury at all, if he had not had
an unusually thin skull or.an unusually weak heart."
Some years after the Polemis case, Lord Justice MacKinnon,
without discussing Polemis, reiterated this view in ®wens v. Liver-
poolz ' in this way : "One who is guilty of negligence to another
must put up with idiosyncracies of his victim that increase the
likelihood or extent of damage to him-it is no answer to a
claim for a fractured skull that its owner had an unusually fragile
one." The court did not give any reasons for this decision but
merely asserted that if the defendant's negligence "in fact caused"
this damage, he should pay.
In the warm afterglow of the Wagon Mound (No. 1), it was
being contended that the thin-skull rule might have to be jettisoned
on the ground that unusual susceptibility was not reasonably fore
seeable. This was not to be, however. In Smith v. Leech Brairt28
Lord Chief Justice Parker was faced with the case of a workman
whose lip was burned by the spattering of some molten metal.
This triggered the development of cancer where he had pre-
malignant cancerous tissues. Three years later, he died and his
widow sued the employer. The. court had to decide whether it
would retain the earlier thin-skull doctrine or whether it would
invoke the new foresight approach to discard it. Lord Chief
Justice Parker, in choosing to preserve the earlier rule, skirted
around the problem by saying that the Wagon Mound "did not
have . . . the thin-skull cases in mind . It has always been the law
of this country that the tortfeasor takes his victim as he fends
him"." He declared that "not a day . . . goes by where some trial
judge does not adopt that principle . . ." and "if the Judicial
Committee had any intention of making an inroad to that doctrine,
I am quite satisfied that they would have said so"." He went on
to rationalize his decision on the ground that one need not fore-
see the extent of the injury ; one need foresee only the type of
injury. "The test is not whether these employers could reasonably
have foreseen that a burn would cause cancer and that he would
die. The question is whether these employers could reasonably
foresee the type of injury he suffered, namely the burn. What, in
this particular case, is the amount of damage which he suffers
as a result of that burn depends on the characteristics and con-
stitution of the victim." He concludes by saying that he is following
the Wagon Mound or the other cases prior to Polemis but not
2 ' [1939] 1 K.B . 394, at p . 400 (Funeral case in doubtful application) .
2 '[1962] 2 Q.B. 405 . 211 Ibid., at p. 414. 80 Ibid.
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Polemis in reaching his decision." Thus, the thin-skull man has
been protected at the expense of the negligent wrongdoer what-
ever test has been applied by the court, which is the case in the
United States" as well . Although the courts have been loath to
explain why they have acted in this way, their consistency has
been rather remarkable.
One recurrent problem that must be overcome in the thin-skull
cases is that of causation . Unless it is established that the conduct
of the defendant caused the aggravated harm, then no liability will
be imposed for the latter. This makes good sense, of course, and is
consistent with general negligence principles . In one case," it was
alleged that death ensued from an occlusion of an artery, that had
been caused by an earlier occlusion that resulted from an injury
negligently inflicted by the defendant. The court refused to allow
the case to go to the jury on the ground that there was no evi-
dence of causation . In another case, Enge v. Trerise," a dissenting
judge argued that there was no evidence that the defendant's
negligence caused the mental disorder alleged to have resulted
from a scar ." He contended that the only evidence given was that
this mental disorder was "precipitated" by the scar, which was
not the same as causing it . Justice Coady, who was in the majority
that permitted recovery, declared that he could find no reason
to deny liability so long as causation is established." Consequently,
causation-in-fact is a necessary pre-requisite to liability."
(a) Pre-existing susceptibility .
Where an injury is aggravated or more severe because of a
pre-existing susceptibility, the victim will recover damages for the
extra losses suffered. Although the principle has been called the
thin-skull rule, cases actually involving thin skulls are extremely
hard to find . Perhaps the closest one can get to such a case is
Hole v. Hocking," where an apparently minor bump on the head
contributed to a sub-arachnoid haemorrhage that damaged the
brain permanently. Despite a complaint about how he disliked
trying to "calculate the incalculable", Chief Justice Napier held
31 Ibid., at p . 415 .
33 Prosser, op. cit ., footnote 24, p . 300 et seq .
a3 yon Hartman v. Kirk, [1961] V.R . 554 .
34 (1960), 26 D.L.R. (2d) 529 .
3s Ibid., at p. 532, per Davey J.A .
3s Ibid., at p . 541 ; see also at p. 542 .
3' Leonard v . B.C . Hydro (1965), 50 W.W.R . 546 (Psychotic con-
dition simulated as "avenue of escape" from unhappy life) .
33 [1962] S.A.S.R. 128 .
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the defendant responsible. In another case, Wilson v. Birt Ltd.,"
a man was hit on the head or neck by a pole that fell from a
scaffolding . As a result of the blow and a pre-existing condition,
the plaintiff contracted epilepsy and serious damage to the tissues
under his brain in the sub-arachnoid space. He recovered for
these losses on the reasoning that if the "variety of damage . . .
[is] reasonably foreseeable the fact that the plaintiff is peculiarly
prone to more excessive injury is not relevant to the defendant's
liability" ." So too, if a man has a weak heart, he will be able to
recover all the damages he suffered, even though they are more
excessive than they would have been in a normal person. Justice
Hutchison, in Williams v. B.A .L.111. Ltd." sent the case to the jury
and explained that an employer could anticipate that some of his
workmen might have unsound hearts.
There are a number of cases where people negligently injured
had weak backs that were aggravated . In Pollock v. Mills and the
City of Calgary," the plaintiff had a pre-condition of disc de
generation which was aggravated in the accident. Although the
court stated that the fact of pre-disposition is "an element to be
taken into account in assessing damages", Porter J.A . increased
the damages awarded at the trial' Similarly, in ®wen v. Dix"
a defendant was held liable for an injury suffered by someone
with a weak or "rotten" disc . Justice Dolt said that when negligence
"aggravates or brings into activity a dormant or diseased condition
or one to which a person is predisposed", the defendant is liable
to . the full amount ."
There are cases of plaintiffs suffering from other assorted
maladies who incurred worse injuries and more suffering than
ordinarily wouldbe the case . When a person with polio virus in his
body received an electric shock which produced poliomyelitis, he
was allowed compensation." In Watts v. Rake" the plaintiff
suffered from a quiescent spondylitis which, after the plaintiff's
leg was broken, developed into arthritis thirteen years earlier than
it ordinarily would have . Justice Dixon concluded simply that : "If
$s [19631 2 S.A. 508."'Ibid., at p. 519, per Harcourt J.
41 [1951] N.Z.L.R. 893.
See also Love v. Port of London, [1959] 2 Ll. R. 541.
48 (1965), 50 W.W.R . 626 (Alta C.A.) .44 Ibid., at p. 629. The trial judge and the dissenter believed
defendant only speeded up what would have occurred anyway.
45 (1946), 210 Ark. 562, 196 S.W . 2d 913.46 Ibid., at p. 915.
47 Sayers v. Perrin, [1966) Q.L.R. 89 (Full Ct.) .
48 (1960), 108 C.L.R . 158 (H.C. Aust.) .
that the
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the injury proves more serious in its incidents and its consequences
because of the injured man's condition, that does nothing but
increase the damages the defendant must pay." Justice Dixon
was of the view that to sever the remaining leg of a one-legged
man or to put out the eye of a one-eyed man "is to do a far more
serious injury" than if the person had two legs or two eyes'
In fixing damages, however, Justice Dixon warned that the cir-
cumstances of the case, including the peculiar susceptibility, must
be taken into account.
One of the best known cases in this area is Warren V. Scruttons
Ltd."' The plaintiff was suffering from an ulcer on his left eye.
His finger was negligently cut by a wire in the defendant's equip
ment which had some kind of "poison" on it . The plaintiff con-
tracted a fever and a virus, one of which caused further ulcers to
appear on his eye. The defendant was held liable for the aggravated
injury since "any consequence which results because the particular
individual has some peculiarity is a consequence for which the
tortfeasor is liable"." No reason was offered. It was, however,
flatly asserted that "that is the right principle" . Here too, in
assessing damages, the court took into account the fact that the
injured eye was somewhat inferior and was subject to other in-
juries as well . In another case, Feldstein v. Alloy Metal Sales,"
the court was prepared to allow compensation for injury to a wo-
man's neck, shoulder and arm that arose because she had suffered
from a malignancy and had undergone radiation treatment nineteen
years earlier. The court relied on the Polemis rule in doing so, after
stating that this was damage "a reasonable man could not foresee" .
Despite this reasoning, the result would not differ by one iota
today.
Females have been accorded full protection, even though they
have a propensity to be more fragile than men. For example, if a
pregnant woman miscarries or has a stillborn child as a result of
the defendant's negligence, she will be able to recover additional
compensation for this loss." In another case, a woman with ovaries
weakened by an operation was held entitled to recover for in-
juries to those ovaries as a result of a sudden stoppage of a train.
4' Ibid., at p. 160.so [19621 1 Ll . R. 497 (Q.B.D .) .si Ibid ., at p. 502.ss [19621 O.R . 476, case dismissed . See also Smith v. Maximovitch
(1968), 68 D.L.R . (2d) 244 (Sask. Q.B.) (All teeth lost because of pre-
existing condition) .
s 3 Malone v. Monongahela Valley Traction (1927), 104 Va . 417.
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The court rationalized its decision by stating simply that "the weak
will suffer more than the strong"."
The thin-skull principle has even been extended to accord
protection to obese people who, because of their large size, suffer
more and take longer to heal than people of average size . When a
"large. and somewhat fleshy" woman (to use Justice Thomson's
diplomatic terms) slipped on a toy on the floor of the defendant's
department store and sprained her ankle, she was entitled to re-
cover for her aggravated injuries." A similar view prevailed where
a negligent waitress spilled hot coffee on a fat lady, for the de-
fendants "took her as they found her" ." There is a weird case of a
"thin-skinned" automobile, to which the thin-skull rule has been
applied. The plaintiff who was driving a Volkswagen automobile
was speared and killed by a highway signpost that ripped. through
the floor boards ." The court rejected the defendant's contention
that had the plaintiff's automobile not had an unusually thin
skin he would have suffered less injury. If injury to a person is
foreseeable, suggested the court, recovery is not limited to in-
juries that are "usual and commonplace"."
Where death ensues_ as a result of a pre-existing susceptibility,
liability also follows. In one case, a train brakeman struck. his head,
an abcess developed, a dormant cancerous condition was ac-
tivated, and death from cancer of the brain followed. A jury
decision for the plaintiff was affirmed" In another case, death
ensued after poison entered the plaintiff's system when he cut
his finger on a milk bottle top. The court stated that liability
followed "whether such resulting damages were reasonably to be-
anticipated or,not . . ." .s° Where a person suffering from blood
pressure and heart condition died three days after he was injured
by a thrown wheel, liability for the death was imposed on the
tortfeasor."
(b) Plaintiff rendered susceptible.
The thin-skull principle applies to _ conditions that arise after
"Linklater v. Min. for Railways (1900), 18 N.Z.L.R . 536, per Williams
J., at p. 540.as Diedericks v. Metropolitan Stores (1956), 6 D.L.R. (2d) 751, at
p. 756.
'6 Thompson v. Lupone (1948), 135 Conn. 236, 62 Atl. 2d 861.s° Oke v. Carra (1963), 38 D.L.R . (2d) 188, at p. 195 reversed on
another point (1963), 41 D.L.R. (2d) 53 (Man. C.A.) .sa Ibid.ss Heppner v. Atchison T. & S.F.R . Co . (1956), 297 S.W . 2d 497 (Mo.) .
"Koehler v. Waukesha Milk Co. (1928), 190 Wis. 52, 208 N.W. 901,
at p. 904, per Eachweiler J.si Barnaby v. O'Leary (1956), 5 D.L.R . (2d) 41, at p. 44, per Doull J.
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an injury is inflicted upon an ordinary person. Put another way,
if the negligence of the defendant renders the skull of the plaintiff
thin, making him more susceptible to additional injury, the de-
fendant will be held responsible for these further complications .
In one case," a boy was hit by a pipe that fell from the defendant's
oil well. As a result, his spine and hip joint were made more
susceptible to tuberculosis, for which consequence the defendant
was held liable . In Oman v. McIntyre," the plaintiff's leg was
fractured as he worked in a ditch. A fat embolism and broncho-
pneumonia developed . A lung tracheotomy was required as a result
of which the plaintiff died . Lord Milligan contended that one need
not foresee the "full effects of the injury". If liability follows for
"unforeseen complications", liability should follow for death."
If a physical injury causes mental suffering to someone beyond
which an ordinary person would incur, the defendant must compen-
sate him for this. Although there were (and still are) many prob
lems with the negligent infliction of mental suffering in the absence
of contact," the courts have encountered less difficulty where there
was a. physical injury as well as mental suffering . As early as
1911, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that the "nervous
system is as much a part of a man's physical being as muscular or
other parts"." Although the Supreme Court was concerned about
the "danger of simulation" and "self-deception", it was prepared
to rely on trial courts to distinguish real from phony claims . It
allowed recovery to the plaintiffs for mental suffering incurred
as a result of being thrown against a seat on a street car when
it hit a train. In Canning v. McFarland c& Gray," the injured
plaintiff recovered for a "traumatic neurosis" that developed .
Justice Schroeder articulated clearly the prevailing view that
"medicine today recognizes traumatic neurosis as a real injury
for which compensation must be given" ." A similar case was
Varga v. Labatt Ltd." where a plaintiff was made ill when he
drank a bottle of beer with chlorine in it. Justice Wells (as he
then was) awarded damages for mental suffering incurred as a
result of an hysteria condition . He stated "if you injure a person
Is Champlin Refining Co . v. Thomas (1939), 93 F. 2d 133 (10th cir.) .
63 [19621 S.L.T. 168 . See also Boss v. Robert Simpson Eastern Ltd.
(1969), 2 D.L.R. (3d) 114 (Subsequent fall because of weakened leg) .
°' Ibid ., at p . 171 .
" See Williams, in Linden, op . cit ., footnote 13, p . 139 .
66 Toronto Railway v. Towns (1911), 44 S.C.R . 268, at p. 276, per
Davies C.J .
67 [19541 O.W.N . 467 . °' Ibid., at p . 471 .s' (1956), 6 D.L.R. (2d) 336 .
1969] .
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who suffers from hysteria you must take him as you find him,
and if the injury is out of all proportion to the event, if it is
genuine, then the one who suffers is entitled to damages"." So
it is . where the plaintiff has a "vulnerable personality" that flares
up into an "hysterical neurosis"." In Enge v. Trerise," a young
girl was left with a scar after an accident . As a result of latent
schizophrenic tendencies, she became schizoid, withdrawn, de-
pressed, heard voices and worried about _ her scar. The court
ordered a new trial and made it quite clear that these mental
repercussions were compensable. The dissenting judge remon-
strated in vain that wrongdoers should not be held for these
"irrational" and "morbid" reactions that were "unforeseeable",
not "direct", and not "caused by" the injury." The American law
is in accord with these decisions.'
(c) After Wagon Mound.
After Wagon Mound (No. 1) and the triumph of foresight, the
courts did not vary their substantive decisions at all, except per-
haps where they were hypnotized by the bewitching appeal of the
word foresight.' In Regush v. Inglis," the plaintiff suffered deep
depression after an accident and was unable to carry on her
business as a result . These losses were said to be compensable.
In hlegretto v. ,layers," a woman whose pelvis was fractured had
a post-concussional psychosis as a result of a "pre-existing ten-
dency to mental disorder"." In deciding to cling to the thin-skull
rule, the court attempted to explain that the principle is not in-
consistent with foresight for the "consequences of even the sim-
plest accident are unpredictable" ." One must foresee any con-
sequence "between a negligible abrasion and permanent incapacity
or death" . Justice Chamberlain admitted that the defendant did
not expect to run down anyone, let alone someone with a person-
ality defect, yet one should foresee that a pedestrian might be hit
"with quite possible disastrous consequences of one sort or an-
°° Ibid ., at p . 349 .
'1 Love v . Port of London, supra, footnote X42. See also Biesauk v.
National Coal Board, [19651 1 All E.R . 895.
"Supra, footnote 34 ; See also Elloway v . Boomars (1968), 69 D.L.R.
(2d) 605 (B.C.H.C .) ; La Brosse v: The City of Saskatoon (1968), 65
W.W.R. 168 (Bask. Q.B .) .as Ibid., at p. 530 et seq .
'Alexander v. Knights (1962), 197 Pa Sup. 799, 177 A. 2d 142
(Neurotic predisposition) .
' See, for example, Ostrowski v. Lotto, supra, footnote 14, discussed
infra .
's (1962), 36 W.W.R. 245 (B.C.) .
77 [19631 S.A.S.R. 313 . ' Ibid ., at p. 317 . 's Ibid., at p. 318 .
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other" ." In Leonard v. B.C . Hydro," a woman fell on a bus and
injured her buttocks slightly . This led to a psychotic condition.
Although the court felt that she was simulating the pain, it stated
in an obiter dictum that the defendants must accept the risk of
a "frail skull or a weak heart . . .", as well as the risk of "aggravat-
ing the condition of a psychotic" ."
One rather weird case is Bates v. Fraser ." Many years ago
the woman plaintiff had suffered from Parkinson's disease. Some
time later she was hit on the head, got amnesia and the symptoms
of Parkinson's disease appeared . When she was injured by this
defendant she was dazed, began to cry and shake, suffered mental
shock, and numerous other symptoms which led to the return of
Parkinsonism with muscular rigidity . The court found that she
was an "hysterical personality with hysterical susceptibility" and the
defendant was liable to the extent that his conduct was the cause of
the aggravation of her mental or physical disability . Justice Grant,
in concluding his reasons, said that although a defendant might
be expected to anticipate emotional stress and hysteria from an
accident but not Parkinsonism, "they are nevertheless liable" if
there is a "positive relationship"." A rather similar case is
Richards v. Baker" where a mother suffering from a small
adanoma of the thyroid developed a toxicosis and sub-acute
neurasthenia as a result of shock suffered on the death of her child .
The only case that is out of step with these decisions is
Ostrowski v. Lotto." It is unquestionably in error and I am certain
it will soon be reversed by the Ontario Court of Appeal. The
trial judge held that a medical operation was negligently per-
formed on the plaintiff's leg and that she was entitled to damages,
but he refused to allow her an amount for her mental suffering.
Justice Keith stated that he had no doubt that it was "directly
related to her reaction to the surgery performed on her" ." Never-
theless, relying on Lord Reid's beguiling language of foreseeability
in Hughes v. Lord Advocate, he concluded that the damage suf-
fered by the plaintiff "unquestionably differs in kind from what
was foreseeable" ."'
Ostrowski v. Lotto is representative of the kind of error courts
can fall into if they rely too much on word formulae . It is the
so Ibid ., at p. 319.
si Supra, footnote 37 .
az Ibid., at p. 553 .
sa (1963), 38 D.L.R. (2d) 30, [19631 1 O.R . 539.
a' Ibid., at p. 38 . as (19431 S.A.S.R . 245.as Supra, footnote 14. a' Ibid., at p. 458 . sa Ibid ., at p. 459.
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term foreseeability which was the culprit here . Had any other
approach been used, the result would probably have been different .
What the court should have done was to ask whether it was fair
in the circumstances to relieve the negligent doctor of the re-
sponsibility of paying damages for this result. In reaching a con-
clusion the court might well ask whether it was a foreseeable
consequence, but it should not ask only this question . The court
should also consider whether the mental injury was directly at-
tributable to the accident. It should weigh the interest being
infringed, that is, physical and mental well-being. It should look at
whether the activity was an insurable one or whether it was being
conducted by a business . It should assess whether the conduct of
the defendant should be deterred . It should balance the, adminis-
trative convenience of the alternatives . After assessing all of these
factors- and only then-should it decide whether to relieve the
defendant of responsibility for this result. Although the courts do
not admit it, this is normally done anyway . It is because of this
that the thin-skull rule has survived for so many years, and will
continue to thrive whatever word formula is fashionable at the
time .
Foreseeability does not help very much and may actually
hinder a meaningful rationalization of the thin-skull problem. It
is not because of foreseeability or directness that those with thin
skulls collect; it is because the courts have felt it unjust to deny
them recovery for their aggravated injuries in all the circumstances.
It may be that one of the reasons for this is that it is foreseeable
that anything can happen to a fragile human being who is injured
in an accident, but there are other reasons too. The loss dis-
tribution and social welfare goals of tort law are relevant to the
decision . Another factor is deterrence, both specific and general."
Defendants should be more careful in their activities if they know
that they are responsible not only for foreseeable injuries but also
for unforeseeable ones . It is also better social cost accounting to
make the activity that triggers these results bear the entire cost
of the accidents it produces. It is terribly difficult administratively
to sort out which injuries are foreseeable and which are not. To
avoid this complex job, the courts may have decided to reimburse
the plaintiff for all the physical and mental consequences of the
injury. Foreseeability theory seems to curtail this kind of analysis.
Therefore, I say down with foreseeability9
" See Câlabresi, The Decision for Accidents : An Approach to Non-fault
Allocation of Costs (1965), 78 Harv . L. Rev . 713 .
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II . The Rescue Problem.
After a false start, the rescuer has become a favourite son of the
common law in recent years. A negligent wrongdoer is liable to
reimburse a rescuer for losses incurred during a rescue attempt.
Foreseeability is now the catchword, but other tests have also been
utilized at different periods to achieve the same result . Playing
word games does not matter too much as long as no one is taken in
by them . The trouble is that judges and lawyers sometimes take
the ritual seriously and go astray .
The recent decision of the Ontario High Court in Jones V.
Wabigwan 9 ° illustrates the confusion that the foresight doctrine
can create . The defendant "borrowed" the plaintiff's car without
his consent. Both men had been attending a wedding reception
together, when the defendant asked for the car. The plaintiff,
his brother-in-law, refused, feeling that the defendant had imbibed
too much alcohol to be trusted with the car. Later that evening,
the plaintiff noticed that his car was missing. The plaintiff later
drove toward town and saw his vehicle being driven along the
road in the opposite direction . He gave chase but could not over-
take the vehicle. He followed it up a side-road and then lost sight
of it as it went over the crest of a hill . When the plaintiff passed
over the top of the hill, he noticed the headlights of a car in a field,
stopped his car and ran five or six steps into the field . Un-
fortunately, he came into contact with a hydro wire, was rendered
unconscious, was severely burned and lost his leg by amputation .
Justice Parker, although satisfied that the defendant was negligent
in hitting the hyro pole, denied the plaintiff recovery . Despite the
evidence of the plaintiff that "as-he entered the field his only
concern was for his brother-in-law",91 Justice Parker stated that
the "purpose of the pursuit was to recover his stolen vehicle and
perhaps to punish the offender . When the plaintiff entered the
field, I am not satisfied that he changed his intent from avenger
to rescuer" ." Justice Parker invoked the magic words of foresight
and suggested that "even if he knew that the plaintiff was pur-
suing him, it is difficult to imagine how the defendant would
foresee that if he put himself in the position of danger the plain-
tiff might suffer injury in attempting to rescue him"." Justice
Parker then administered the finishing touches. He concluded that
"the negligence of the defendant was spent long before the plain-
9° Supra, footnote 14, per Parker J.si Ibid., at p. 838.
11 Ibid., at pp. 838-839. 93 Ibid., at p. 838.
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tiff arrived on the scene".94 "At the time the defendant was driving
negligently; the plaintiff was not within the ambit of the risk", he
asserted . The defendant could not reasonably anticipate that a
person driving in a motor vehicle more than a mile behind would
be injured if he drove off the main road" because there was no
one in the immediate area . The defendant owed no duty to the
plaintiff, "the damages were not reasonably foreseeable and are
too remote"."
These phrases are merely words that explain nothing. There
are numerous cases that say a rescuer is foreseeable." The idea of
negligence being "spent" is ludicrous and cannot be taken seri
ously, at least after such a short lapse of time. To contend that
a person driving a mile behind someone on a highway is not
endangered by the latter's conduct, whether on or off the road,
is to ignore the facts of modern highway travel. In addition, the
words foresight and remoteness state a conclusion, and do not
offer reasons for reaching that conclusion. Now there may very
well have been appropriate reasons for denying the plaintiff
recovery in Jones v. Wabigwan, but the fact is that they were not
expressed by the trial judge. The foresight analysis helped to dis-
guise the value choices involved in the decision and is, therefore,
not worthy of our support.
Sometimes foresight analysis yields excellent results as in the
recent decision of Justice Lacourciere, Matthews v. McLaren."
Perhaps the most significant part of the case' deals with the duty
to rescue rather than the duty to the rescuer. The court held that
there was an obligation upon the master of a boat to rescue an
invited guest who fell overboard. Relying on the legislative policy
enunciated by )Parliament in the Canada Shipping Act, the court
created a new duty to act." Justice Lacourciere brilliantly ra-
tionalized it thus : "parliament reflecting the conscience of the
community has seen fit to' impose on the master a duty to render
assistance to any stranger, including an enemy alien `found at sea
and in danger of being lost' (s . 526, Canada Shipping Act) ; the
94 Ibid., at p . 839 .
95 Ibid.
ss Ibid., at p. 140.
9' See, for example, Wagner v . International Railway Co. (1921), 232
N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 .
91 [19691 2 O.R. 137 .
"Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C ., 1952, c . 29, as am . See generally on
this problem Linden, Tort Liability for Criminal Nonfeasance (1966), 44
Can . Bar Rev. 25 . See also Colonial Coach Lines Ltd. v. Bennett and
C.P.R . (1967), 66 D.L.R. (2d) 396 (Ont . C.A.) ; Menow v . Honsberger
and Jordan House Ltd. (1969), not yet reported, per Haines 7 .
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common law can be no less solicitous for the safety of an invited
guest and must impose upon the master the duty to attempt a
rescue, when this can be done without imperilling the safety
of the vessel, her crew and passengers . The common law must
keep pace with the demands and expectations of a civilized com-
munity, the sense of social obligation, and brand as tortious
negligence the failure to help a man overboard in accordance
with the universal custom of the sea."
In dealing with the duty to the rescuer, Justice Lacourciere
asked "was [the] voluntary rescue attempt within the ambit of
risk created by the defendant's negligence, in a reasonably fore
seeable way"?'" After considering numerous authorities and the
literature, he concluded that the rescue was "within the risk
created by the defendant's negligent conduct""' and imposed
liability. Again, although the opinion is clear and perfectly in
accord with the received doctrine, it is difficult to glean from it
the real reasons why rescuers are so favoured . To state that they
are "foreseeable" and "within the risk" does not satisfy me com-
pletely. There is and should be more to it than that.
(a) Duty to the rescuer.
There was a time when rescuers fared badly in the courts.
Sometimes causation rationale was used and other times the doc-
trine of voluntary assumption of risk was invoked to deny them
compensation . In Anderson V. Northern Railway of Canada ... the
causation approach was taken. Although a jury had found for
the family of the plaintiff who was killed after leaping in front
of a train to save a woman as she walked along tracks with her
husband's lunch, the Common Pleas Court reversed the decision
and ordered a non-suit . This was affirmed by the Court of Ap-
peal"' in a split decision . Two members of the Court of Appeal
thought that the question of the foolhardiness of the rescue attempt
should be decided by the jury, not by the court. However, the
other two judges who won the day felt that the cause of the in-
jury to the deceased was his own conduct, not the act of the
defendant . Chief Justice Hagarty and Justice Gwynne in the
intermediate Appeal Court had also rested their decision on
causation . Chief Justice Hagarty explained that they could not
permit "admiration of his gallant self-sacrifice" to deter them from
.ioo Matthews v. MacLaren, supra, footnote 98, at p. 146....Ibid., at p. 150.'0' (1876), 25 U.C.C.P . 301.
103 Burton, Patterson JJ. (Split decision 2-2) .
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holding that the injury was "self-sought" and "self-caused" .",
Justice Gwynne agreed that it was a "noble exposure", but "his
own sole act intentionally exposed self to danger"." Although it is
far from clear, one might rationalize the Anderson decision on
the ground that there was no negligence on the part of the defen-
dant or, alternatively, that the plaintiff was contributorily negli-
gent and, therefore, barred absolutely from recovery.
In another case, Kimball v. Butler Bros.,"' the volunteer
theory was invoked to deny compensation to the family of the
deceased who suffocated during a rescue attempt when a fire
broke out in the Detroit Tunnel as it was being built. Justice
Garrow concluded that the rescuer had acted "solely as a volun-
teer" and with a "full comprehension of danger".'" Justice
Meredith stated that there was no evidence of negligence by the
defendant. Even if there were, he contended, someone who is not
himself in danger and voluntarily goes into it, cannot be protected.
These cases were 'gradually eclipsed by more humanitarian
ones . Seymour v. Winnipeg Electric Railway,"' an early Manitoba
case decided in 1910, foreshadowing what was to emerge later
in the United States and England, refused to follow Anderson
and declared on a demurrer that a rescuer could recover
from a negligent wrongdoer. Justice Richards opted for a bold
approach . He recognized that "the promptings of humanity to-
wards the saving of life are amongst the noblest instincts of
mankind"."' Justice Richards then concluded that "the trend of
modern legal thought is toward holding that those who risk their
safety in attempting to rescue others who are put in peril by the
negligence of third persons are entitled to claim such compensa-
tion from such third persons for injuries they may receive in such
attempts", 11 ° which is particularly the case if "those whom it is
sought to rescue are infirm or helpless". As an afterthought,
Justice Richards added that the company had "notice" that "some
brave man is likely to risk his own life to save the helpless", which
indicated that the idea of notice or knowledge (or foresight if
you will) was a relevant consideration.
Twenty-three years after the Canadian courts had pretty well
sorted out the problem of the rescuer, the English courts were
still floundering around with the concepts of causation and volenti.
104 Ibid ., at p. 307 . 105 Ibid., at p . 309 .
"1 (1910), 15 O.W.R . 221 (C.A.) .
1°'Ibid., at p. 222.
108 (1910), 13 W.L.R . 566 (Man. C.A.) .. . .Ibid., at p. 588 . " 1 Ibid., at p . 568 .
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For example, in Cutler v. United Dairies,"' the plaintiff was in-
jured when he tried to hold the head of a runaway horse in response
to the driver's shout for help . The jury's verdict for the plaintiff
was overturned and the action dismissed on the ground that "the
damage must be on his own head" because of volenti and because
"a new cause has intervened"."' Justice Slesser drew a distinction
between a case where someone dashes out to save a child in
danger, because "there is no novus actus interveniens" . "However
heroic and laudable may have been this act, it cannot properly
be said that it was not in the legal sense the cause of the ac-
cident ." 113 This discussion about cause and volenti is less than
satisfactory because we do not learn why' the court decided the
case as it did. The confusion is confounded when one compares
the Cutler case with Brandon v. Osborne Garrett & Co."" Justice
Swift avoided the problem raised in the Cutler case by categoriz-
ing as "instinctive" the rescue act of a wife who tried to pull her
husband away from glass falling from a skylight. This sorry state
of affairs could not continue .
In the United States, Justice Cardozo in Wagner v. Interna-
tional Railway Co."' articulated the principle that was destined to
be adopted throughout the common-law world. "Danger invites
rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law does
not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to its
consequences . It recognizes them as normal . It places their effects
within the range of the natural and probable . The wrong that im-
perils life is a wrong to the imperiled victim ; it is a wrong also to
his rescuer . The risk of rescue, if only it be not wanton, is born
of the occasion . The emergency begets the man. The wrongdoer
may not have foreseen the coming of a deliverer. He is accountable
as if he had."
The English courts in 1938 finally saw fit to follow the
Canadian and American lead and to recognize the claim of the
rescuer . In Haynes v. Harwood,"' a police constable tried to push
a woman out of the way of a runaway horse and was injured in
the attempt. Distinguishing the Cutler case on the grounds (1)
that "nobody was in any danger""' there, and (2) that a police-
man was "expected to" aid those in danger "in pursuance of a
111 (193312 K.B . 297 (C.A .) .
"" Ibid., at p. 303, per Scrutton L.J ."' Ibid., at p. 306.
"1 [19241 1 K.B . 548.
'15 Supra, footnote 97.
"1 [19341 2 K.B . 240, affd [19351 1 K.B . 146.
11' [bid., at p. 249 (2 K.B .) .
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duty",113 the trial judge, Justice Finlay, found for the policeman.
The Court of Appeal affirmed . Lord Justice Greer accepted the
reasoning of Justice Finlay and declared that "it would be a little
surprising if a rational system of law . . . denied any remedy
to a brave man".119
Lord Justice Maugham articulated very clearly the appropriate
process of decision-making in this area . Is the act "so exceptional"
that it should be treated as a novus actus? 12° "The law has to
measure the interests which he sought to protect and the other
interests involved ", 121 he explained. One must take into account
the "energy and courage" of the reasonable man, the degree of
danger involved and the response of the rescuer. If one ap-
proaches the problem in this way a more rational and under-
standable determination can be made. In Australia, the obligation
to a rescuer was also recognized in Chester v. Waverly Corp."'
on the ground that "a reasonable person would have foreseen the
possibility of rescue"."'
Since the Iaraynes v. Harwood breakthrough, the English courts
have showered much attention on the rescuer. In Videan v. British
Transport Commission,"' the duty to the rescuer extended to
cover even the rescuer of an unforeseeable trespasser. The mental
gymnastics engaged in by the court in Videan were wondrous to
behold . The risk doctrine was manipulated to the point of in-
credulity. Lord Justice Denning found that; although the child
trespasser was himself not reasonably foreseeable, his rescuer
was! He reasoned that one need not foresee the particular emer-
gency, only that a stationmaster might attempt a rescue of some-
one"'-in this case his child. Perhaps a better rationale, however,
was Lord Justice Denning's statement to the effect that : "Whoever
comes to the rescue,, the law should see that he does not suffer
for it.""' Two of the judges did not accept this reasoning and
seem to have based their decision on the special duty of an
employer to his stationmaster reserving judgment on whether
an ordinary member of the public would be equally protected."'
In this case, the doctrine of foresight was an inappropriate in-
strument'for the solution of this problem.
"I Ibid ., at p . 250 (2 K.B .) .
119 Ibid ., at p . 152 (1 K.B .) ."'Ibid., at p. 161 (1 K.B .) .121 Ibid., at p . 162 (1 K.B.) .
122 (l939), 62 C.L.R.1 .123 Ibid., at p. 39, per Evatt J ."4 [19631 2 All E.R . 860 (C.A.) .
12s Ibid., at p. 969 . 12s Ibid . "' Ibid., at p. 872.
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So favoured is the rescuer today that he has been allowed
reparation for mental suffering where an ordinary bystander would
have had difficulty collecting. In Chadwick v. British Transport
Commission,"' someone who took part in rescue operations after
a train wreck suffered anxiety neurosis. He was permitted to re-
cover, the court reasoning in terms of foresight. "The very fact
of rescue must . . . involve unexpected things happening", and
one need not foresee "every step .. .. . .
(b) Duty of the rescued.
Not only is a negligent person liable to the rescuer who comes
to help a third person that he endangers, but if he gets himself
into trouble, he is responsible to a rescuer who comes to his rescue.
One early Canadian case, Dupuis v. New Regina Trading Co .
Ltd."' encountered some difficulty with this issue. The deceased
was killed when he fell down an elevator shaft trying to rescue
a lady employee of the defendant who had been caught in the
defendant's elevator. Although the case might be explained on the
ground that there was no negligence on the part of the, defendant,
or any of its employees, there was some discussion of "derivative
negligence", an idea that added needless complexity to the prob-
lem. The court indicated that unless there was liability to a third
person who was endangered there could not be any responsibility
to a rescuer . Relying on some language in Wagner v. International
Railway, the court stated that liability to the "latter flows from
or is based upon the former" . Justice McDonald articulated the
principle in this way : "[W]hen a person, in breach of a duty to-
wards another, places the latter in danger, he, as a reasonable man,
should foresee that anyone seeing such other in danger will react
to the spectacle and attempt a rescue . It is thus the danger, actual
or apprehended, to that other which brings the rescuer within
the ambit of the negligent party's duty to take due care."" Con-
tinuing, the court declared, "there being no original negligence
there could be no derivative negligence ; there being no `primary',
there could be no secondary negligence ; the defendant not having
through negligence caused physical injury to [the girl] could not
cause consequent injury to the deceased". This seemed for a time
to have ruled out the liability of the rescued in Canada, an un-
necessary restriction .
les [196712 All E.R . 445 (K.B.D.) .129 Ibid., at p. 952.
139 [194314 D.L.R . 275.131 Ibid., at p. 284.
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In spite of all this language, the court does not seem to have
grasped the idea that there might be vicarious liability for the
negligence of an employee who, by endangering himself negligently,
attracts the attention of a rescuer. The court discussed a case that
dealt with this issue, Butler v. Tersey Coal News,"' but seems to
have missed the important point made by it. Instead, the court
focussed on the issue of whether anyone was in danger and stated
that "there was nothing that necessarily or obviously suggested
danger in going to the aid of [the employee]""' (despite the fact
that she appears to have been hanging by her heel over an open
elevator shaft) .
The Dupuis case is a weird one in which we should not place
too much confidence. The late Dean Cecil Aright, commenting
on the case,"' criticized the courts for failing to extend "their hu
manitarian doctrine of rescue this far"."' Foresight, he suggested,
was not the only reason for deciding these cases; instead, he con-
tended that "as between a careless man and the heroic rescuer
the policy of the law favours shifting the loss from the latter to the
former"."' Although fault to a third person is the usual situation,
"fault with respect to oneself should also suffice" .137
Dean Wright's plea did not fall on deaf ears and Dupuis has
now been discredited . Since Baker v. Hopkins,"3 it has been
recognized that there is a duty to avoid negligently getting oneself
in danger so as to attract a rescuer. The case concerned a doctor
who was overcome by gas fumes while attempting to rescue a
workman trapped in a mine. The action against the mine opera-
tors was successful. Because the workman being rescued was held
ten per cent at fault, the court considered the duty of the rescued
to a rescuer. In a dictum, Justice Barry disapproved of Dupuis
and stated that, although no one owes a duty to preserve his own
safety, "if by his own carelessness a man puts himself into a
position of peril of a kind that invites rescue, he would in law
be liable for any injury caused to someone whom he ought to
have foreseen would attempt to come to his aid"."' ®n appeal, the
trial judge was upheld, but the judges did not feel-it necessary to
13a (1932), 109 N.J .L . 255, 60 Atl . 659. The employer of the negligent
person rescued was held liable to the rescuer .
133 gee supra, footnote 130, at p. 285.
134 (1943), 21 Can . Ear Rev . 758 .. ..Ibid., at p. 763 .136 Ibid ., at p. 764.137 Ibid., at p. 765 .
133 [1958] 3 All E.R . 147 (Q.E.D .), affd [19591 1 W.L.R. 966, 3 All
E.R . 225 (C.A.) .136 Ibid ., at p . 153 ([1958] 3 All E.R.) .
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comment on this point."' In Australia a rescued person may be
responsible to his rescuer. In Chapman v. Hearse,"' Dr. Chap-
man's family recovered from the defendant motorist who ran
into him while he was helping someone on the highway. The
person who was being helped by Dr . Chapman was added to the
action as a third party by the defendant. The court was, therefore,
faced with the question of whether a rescued person could be held
responsible for injury to his rescuer. Without mentioning the Dupuis
and Baker cases, the court held the person being rescued twenty-
five per cent at fault, and stated that if support were necessary,
"ample can be found in the analogous rescue cases" . The Austral-
ian High Court, therefore, assumed that an individual bears an
obligation to potential rescuers to keep himself out of positions
of peril.
The notion of derivative rights is dead."' This had to be be-
cause it made no sense, except as an interesting legal construct.
It prevented the court from rewarding a class of rescuers no less
deserving than those already being protected. Foreseeability theory
at first was used to deny reparation and later to grant it, which
indicates that it does not solve everything . Dean Wright correctly
saw that, whatever theory was adopted, the court would favour a
rescuer over a careless person, which is as it should be.
(c) Rescuers of property.
As one might expect, the law's concern over rescuers of prop-
erty was not as intense as it was over rescuers of people . There was
an early dictum in the leading American case of Eckert v. Long
Island Railway Co."' to the effect that if the rescue involved the
"mere protection of property""' there would be no tort recovery ."'
By 1892, however, the Supreme Court of Canada in Connel v.
Prescott" had recognized that someone hurt attempting to protect
endangered horses could recover from the negligent wrongdoer.
In Hutterly v. Imperial Oil,"' the plaintiff tried to drive his car out
of a burning garage and was injured in the attempt. The negligent
"'Lord Justice Morris specifically avoids the question at p . 234 ([1959]
3 All E.R .) .
141 [19611 S.A.S.R . 51, aff'd 106 C.L.R . 112.
"See Low, Volenti, Duty and the Rescuer, [19591 Fac. L. Rev. 118 ."' (1871), 43 N.Y. 502 .
"' Ibid ., at p. 506 .
"See also Wilkinson v . Kinneil, etc. (1897), 34 S.L.R. 533, per Lord
Young; Love v. New Fairview Corp. (1904), 10 R.C.R . 330, per Martin J .
(Saved pants too) ."c (1892), 2 O.A.R . 49, aff'd 22 S.C.R . 147 .
147 [19561 3 D.L.R . (2d) 719 .
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defendant was held liable for the loss to the car and the injury
to the plaintiff on the ground that the plaintiff's attempt to save
his property was not unreasonable . This was so even though he
could have escaped himself without being injured. There are also
cases where people who were injured while helping to put out
fires negligently caused were granted compensation."'
Not only is a person hurt while rescuing property allowed
recovery, but compensation is permitted for the damage to property
suffered in the attempt. In Thorn v. .Tames,"' a servant tried to
protect his employer's separator from a fire by hooking some
horses to it and pulling it free . He failed to save the separator
and the horses were burned . The original negligent defendant was
held liable to pay for the horses because the rescue effort was
reasonable in the circumstances.
(d) Foolhardy rescue and contributory negligence .
A rescuer will not be protected in every instance ; there must
be some reasonably perceived danger to person or goods and the
conduct of the rescuer must be reasonable in the circumstances.
This does not mean that there has to be actual danger, nor does
it mean . that perfection is demanded in the actor's conduct.
The early cases seemed to demand that there be actual danger
to someone before a duty to the rescuer would be created. . In
McDonald v. Burr... the dismissal of a rescuer's claim was af
firmed on appeal.- His allegation that a team of runaway horses
had endangered some children was not accepted by the court.
It preferred to rely on the evidence of another witness to the effect
that the children were farther away from the horses and not in
any danger."' As one of the requisites of recovery, apparently,
the court required that the plaintiff show actual danger to the
children . In another early case, Brine v. Dubbin'S 2 the court denied
recovery to someone who had undertaken to warn oncoming traffic
by lighting matches after an accident . The court was of the view
that there was "no immediate peril" and "no emergency" ; since
the rear lights of the damaged vehicle were visible, there was
"no certainty of injury to person or property ", 153 although perhaps
there was a "possibility" or at most a probability of injury . The
`8 Russell v. 1VIcCabe, [1962] N.Z.L.R . 392; Hyett v. G.W . Ry ., [19481
1 1C .B . 345 (C.A.) .
14e (1903), 14 Man. R. 373 .
150 [1919] 3 W.W.R. 925 (Sask. C.A .) .151 Ibid., at p. 827.
15z [19331 2 W.W.R. 25 (Alta S.C .) .153 Ibid ., at p. 30 .
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plaintiff's conduct, reasoned the court, was not within the reason-
able foresight of the original wrongdoer and liability was therefore
denied. This principle was echoed by Lord Justice Maugham in
Haynes v . Harwood"" when he stated that, if someone were injured
trying to subdue a horse that bolted on a desolate country road,
he would be denied recovery, since no one was endangered . This
rule was too harsh. It served to impede rather than to encourage
rescue attempts and, happily, is no longer the law .
It is now recognized that the duty to the rescuer does not
depend upon actual danger to someone-it is enough if he reason-
ably believes that someone is in peril."' A rescuer will now be
compensated even if his attempt could not have been successful,"'
as where the person being rescued was already dead."' In Ould v.
Butler's Wharf,"' a rescuer, believing wrongly that a fellow work-
man was in danger of being hit by the hook of a crane, tried
to push him out of the way. When he did this the endangered
man dropped the case of rubber he was carrying on the rescuer's
foot. Although the rescuer may have been wrong in his assess-
ment of the danger, Justice Gorman permitted him to recover
because he felt there was an "imminent serious accident"."' In
other words, a futile rescue attempt may be compensated by tort
law as long as it is a reasonable one. This is understandable
because it is often difficult to judge whether a rescue will yield
positive results as where children are lost in the woods or miners
are buried in a mine . If there is a reasonable chance of saving a
life or avoiding an injury, the common law should by an award
of damages encourage rescue operations .
Not only must there be a situation of reasonably perceived
danger, but the response of the rescuer must be reasonable .
If someone standing on the Golden Gate Bridge sees a man
drowning 1,000 feet below and leaps to the rescue, his widow
will not be compensated . The courts have most frequently justified
this result by holding that the rescuer was "foolhardy",is° "rash""'
or "needlessly reckless" .161 In other words, if someone conducts
a rescue "with gross rashness and recklessness", he will be denied
3s4 Supra, footnote 116.ass Wagner v. International Railway, supra, footnote 97.ass Fleming, op. cit., footnote 25 (4th ed., 1967), p. 167.
3s7 Wagner v. International Railway, supra, footnote 97.
3s6 [195312 Ll . R. 44 ."'Ibid., at p. 46 .
3so Baker v. Hopkins, supra, footnote 138, at p. 153, per Barry J. See
also Fleming, op . cit ., footnote 25, p. 167.3s3 Haigh v. Grand Trunk Ry. (1914), 7 W.W.R . 806 (Alta S.C .) .
3sz Seymour v. Winnipeg Electric, supra, footnote 108, at p. 571.
1969]
	
Down with Foreseeability! 569
compensation."' The currently popular doctrine explaining these
cases is that a foolhardy rescue attempt is not foreseeable and,
therefore, no duty is owed. This is no more satisfactory than the
other theories, such as volenti and causation"' that have been
advanced in the past for reaching this same conclusion . These
verbal justifications disguise rather than illuminate what the courts
are doing. Courts rightly feel that it is unfair to make the ori-
ginal wrongdoer pay for the additional losses of a foolish rescuer.
It is true that such losses are rather unexpected or unusual con-
sequences and thus could be termed unforeseeable, but there is
more to it than that . Tort law seeks to encourage men to aid one
another, but not to do so stupidly . By denying compensation to
the foolhardy rescuer, tort law attempts to diminish the frequency
of foolish and futile rescue efforts. And yet one cannot calibrate
too precisely nor judge too stringently the humane conduct of a
would-be-rescuer . The solution which the courts are groping for,
therefore, must protect the rescuer but cannot promote foolish
and wasteful exercises. The test of foolhardiness is not good
enough because it is an all or nothing-at-all approach. A more
delicate measuring rod is necessary.
Comparative negligence could offer more flexibility to the
system, but there is little evidence so far of the courts using this
device. There has been some unfortunate loose talk about denial
of recovery to contributorily negligent rescuers . Foolhardiness and
recklessness has been blurred with mere carelessness . For example,
one court stated that if a rescuer "did something a reasonable
person ought not to have done""' he will be denied recovery .
This may have been unavoidable prior to the advent of compara-
tive negligence statutes, but today courts should apportion in these
situations . Instead of having only two categories-foolhardy and
less than foolhardy-several different evaluations can be made .
Courts no longer have to refuse all compensation to the negligent
(but not foolhardy) rescuer."' Such a claimant should be able to
recover a reduced award which would grant him recognition for
his heroism without ignoring his carelessness .
The balancing process undergone is depicted in Baker v. Hop-
"a Woods v . Caledonian Ry . (1886), 23 S.L.R . 798 .
164 Baker v . Hopkins, supra, footnote 138, at p . 234, per Morris L.J .,
dictum .
165 Brandon v . Osborne Garrett & Co ., [1924] 1 K.B . 548, at p . 552."'As in Berg v. Great N. Railway (1897), 73 N.W . 648 (Minn.) and
hinted at in a dictum by Strong J . in Anderson v. Northern Ry., supra,
footnote 102, at p . 320 .
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kins,"' despite the fact that the court ignored the possibility of
split liability. It will be recalled that a doctor, who was overcome
by gas during an attempt to rescue some miners, was permitted
to recover from the mine-owners (even though the rescued miner
was held ten per cent at fault) . Lord Justice Ormerod felt that the
circumstances of the risk to the rescuer might be so great and the
chance of rescue so small that one might not expect a rescue to
be tried."' In the Baker case, however, he held that the conduct
of the doctor was "not foolhardy" . I submit, there is no reason
to jettison the ordinary tort principles in this situation. Comparative
negligence is available for use here as it is elsewhere and could
provide a wider range of solutions for these problems .
It has been held that the onus of showing a rescuer was
foolhardy rests on the defendant."' This is quite consistent with
the ordinary onus of proof principles concerning contributory
negligence. Moreover, where there is a jury, it must decide as
a matter of fact whether the rescuer was needlessly reckless
(and presumably if he was contributorily negligent) ."' The courts
have wisely refrained from judging too harshly the attempts at
rescue. Thus, where a rescuer was injured trying to save a child
in circumstances where it may have been unnecessary, he has
been permitted recovery."'
In these rescue cases the same decisions have been reached
whatever formula was used. This is because the courts have de-
cided to use tort law to encourage rescuers by rewarding them
if they are injured . In addition, the courts are hopeful that they
will deter, both specifically and generally, enterprisers who cause
accidents . If someone knows that he will be liable not only to those
he injures but to their rescuers, he may be more careful. It is also
better for an activity to pay its way by being required to re-
imburse not only those injured by the activity directly but also the
rescuers of those injured . Furthermore, the loss distribution and
social welfare goals of tort law are served by spreading liability .
Foreseeability disguises this analysis and, therefore, I say down
with foreseeability!
Conclusion
We have seen that the courts have compensated plaintiffs with
's' Supra, footnote 138 .'" Ibid ., at p . 237 .
'69 Baker v. Hopkins, ibid., at p . 244, per Willmer L.J.l'o Anderson v . Northern Ry., supra, footnote 102, at p. 323, per Strong
J . (2-2 decision for defendant) . Seymour v. Winnipeg Electric, supra, foot-
note 108, at p. 59 ."' Morgan v . Aylen, [19421 1 All E.R. 489 .
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thin skulls and rescuers . They have done this both under- fore-
seeability doctrine and under its predecessor doctrines. Despite
the high hopes engendered by the foresight rule, it has not made
the solution of cases any juster, simpler or more logical. In fact,
the very opposite may have been achieved. In cases like Ostrowski
v. Lotto... and Jones v. Wabigwan,l" the foreseeability doctrine
actually renders us a disservice by confusing the judge and di-
verting his attention from what he should be considering.
If foreseeability is dead, however, what should replace,it? We
must return to the much-maligned approach of Justice Andrews,
the dissenting judge in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railway." In
analysing the proximate cause technique of limiting liability, Justice
Andrews uttered heresy. "What we . . . mean by the word 'proxi-
mate' is that, because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough
sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of
events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical
politics ." Although Justice Andrews believed that foresight should
have "some bearing", no one consideration can solve the problem.
"It is all a question of expediency . There are no fixed rules to
govern our judgment." The court, he contended, must consider a
variety of issues, for instance was there a "natural and continuous
sequence between the cause and effect", was the conduct a "sub-
stantial factor" in producing the result, was there a ".`direct con-
nection", was the result "too remote . . . in time and space"?1°5 He
concluded by confiding that "we draw an uncertain and wavering
line, but draw it we must as best we can. . . . It is all a question of
fair judgment, always keeping in mind the fact that we endeavour
to make a rule in each case that will be practical and in keeping
with the general understanding of mankind"." Foresight is rele-
vant, therefore, but it cannot rule us . Other factors are relevant,
but no one of them can rule us . Only intelligent balancing of
all the relevant criteria and facts can save us from hypocrisy,
on the one hand, and injustice, on the other.
We should attempt to fashion some guidelines for the recurring
situations, but we cannot control by rules all the weird, freakish"'
events that manage to transpire. We must recognize the limited
i7z Supra, footnote 14 .
Ibid .
1°4 (1928), 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E . 99."s Ibid., at p. 104 (N.E .) .is Ibid .i°' See the recent case of McKenzie et al. v. Hyde et al. (1967), 64
D.L.R . (2d) 362, at p. 375, aff'd (1968),. 66 D.L.R. (2d) 655 (Man.
C.A.) where the terms "freakish" and "one in a million" were used.
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capacity of legal rules in this complex area and place our trust
in the judge and jury . The question we are concerned with can be
formulated quite simply-should this defendant, whose conduct
has fallen below the standard of the community, be relieved of
paying for the consequence of which this plaintiff complains? By
asking the question in this way, we recognize the political nature
of the choices that are open to us and encourage the honest, open
assessment of competing policies in each type of case . "The judg-
ment lies in the realm of values and what you choose depends on
what you want." l '8 These decisions are not easy ones and we
fool no one by insisting that they can be . Because of its illusory
simplicity, the foresight test tends to discourage thoughtful anal-
ysis . Down with foreseeability!
3 '8 Gregory, Proximate Cause in Negligence-A Retreat From Rational-
ization (1938), 6 U. Chi . L . Rev . 36, at p. 47 . See also J . C . Smith, op.
cit., footnote 13, p. 114 .
